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OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND 
BUSINESS DECISIONS" 
T HAT there has been a very rapid growth of interest in the operations research technique within the past dec- 
ade is well known. Apparently the origins of operations re- 
search are to be found in the cooperative efforts of scientists 
during World War 11. However, in the process of becom- 
ing, or attempting to become, an independent discipline, 
operations research has developed its own historians who are 
prepared to trace the roots of the new discipline to Thomas 
Edisonl and, in one case, to PlatoV2 My own interest is narrow 
by comparison and centers upon the usefulness of operations 
research in business decision making. 
I t  is my impression that there are two matters that deserve 
attention if the sole point at issue is the usefulness of opera- 
tions research as an aid to management. The first is the ex- 
tent to which operations research can legitimately be re- 
garded as a new discipline with essential unity of method 
and purpose. The second is the extent to which operations 
research can achieve results of genuine importance in the in- 
dustrial environment. I believe that operations research fails 
to qualify as a unique, self-contained discipline, and yet 
embodies enough that is new and helpful to be wortlly of 
managerial attention. In support of these contentions, I will 
present, first, a critical appraisal of the operations research 
discipline; and second, a brief assessment of the practical 
value of the operations research technique in industry. A 
critical appraisal of the operations research discipline is 
essential to any assessment of its value in industry because 
the particular functions that operations research can per- 
* A paper presented to the Business Research Section of the South- 
western Social Science Association, April 19, 1957. 
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form effectively for business managers depend upon the very 
nature of the discipline and its techniques. 
An outsider seeking an appreciation of the nature and 
scope of operations research turns, quite naturally I be- 
lieve, to the growing literature of the discipline and to the 
statements of its advocates. A modest amount of research 
in this direction has convinced me, at least provisionally, 
that operations research has more to fear from its friends 
than from its enemies. A statement or two by the friends of 
operations research may be sufficient to establish this con- 
tention. 
We are told, for example, that: 
The Theory of Value reveals that operations research, as the 
science of decision, embraces not only the content of all the 
sciences-physics, social sciences, economic sciences, the 
philosophies including ethics, the political sciences-but also 
that it is intimately concerned with the postulates of these 
sciences as well. In this respect operations research can be 
regarded as the most fundamental of all  science^.^ 
Should one concede that operations research is this broad, 
it is not difficult to understand why the article from which 
the passage was cited required four authors, or to appreciate 
why operations research is, in general, a group effort. 
Another instance of what I take to be an overly ambitious 
view has been expressed by the Earl of Halsbury. In an essay 
entitled (amazingly enough), "From Plato to the Linear 
Program," Halsbury states: 
I shall be concerned in this paper with a still wider field of 
operational research, a field standing in relation to any single 
operational study that might be proposed, somewhat as the 
complex number field stands to any finite number ring. This 
problem arises when we consider society as a whole and ask 
how its performance can be optimi~ed.~ 
Halsbury's remarks on the optimization of the social proc- 
ess are of no special interest. But, imbedded in his essay is 
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one passage which economists will find to be quite revealing. 
Halsbury writes : 
. . . We have in England at the National Physical Laboratory 
a simulator that will demonstrate Keynesian theory to the 
non-mathematician. The spectator can raise the bank rate on 
one dial setting and watch the consequences thereof upon 
unemployment represented by a calibrated volt- or ammeter 
at  another point of the instrument. He can couple two of 
these simulated systems together in an importer-exporter re- 
lationship and watch the effect of a tariff barrier upon their 
reciprocal trading. Having thrown the pair into oscillation by 
some such device he can play with the controls in an endeavor 
to restore stability and, on failing to achieve it, can be shown 
by the denlollstrator how to do so. 
Controversial economics are not possible under these circum- 
stances; one cannot be partisan with respect to the reading 
of an instr~rnent.~ 
It would appear that we have here an instance of model 
building with a vengeance. Competence in circuitry design 
is commenclable; but its relevance to economic matters is, 
I think, not great. The advocates of operations research 
weaken their case immeasurably when they couple the most 
superficial of observations on economic matters with sweep- 
ing analysis of the whole social process. I would conclude 
that the scope of operations research (as written about, if 
not as practiced) is often too broad to be manageable; and 
that in the process of assimilating the functions of many 
separate disciplines, operations research takes on tasks be- 
yond its apparent capabilities. 
One may, of course, object that any discipline, and espe- 
cially one in its foimative stages, is very likely to End some 
of its devotees given to exuberance, even intemperance, in 
evaluating and defining their subject matter. But having 
made this allowance, and having applied some appropriate 
discount factor to the more outrageous claims made for 
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operations research, I am forced to the belief that extrav- 
agance remains. Nor can I draw much comfort from Philip 
Morse's 1953 statement as retiring president of the Opera- 
tions Research Society of America that: 
We should no longer have tsouble explaining the scope and 
methods of operations research to the layman. We already 
can say: Operations Research is the activity carried on by 
members of the Opmdations Research Society; its methods are 
those reportcd in our JOURNAL? 
I would not pursue this line of attack at all were it not the 
fact that, superficially at least, disturbing parallels can be 
drawn betwen operations research now and "scient8c man- 
agement" then. Serious practitioners of operations research 
could well be disturbed by excesses conlnlitted within their 
own ranlts. Much that was path-breaking in the "scientific 
management" movement was lost, at least temporarily, in 
the inevitable reaction to extreme statements as to the power 
and significance of the new approach. Operations research 
may be running the same risk. 
Irrespective of the more extreme claims made from within 
the operations research profession, is there anything in the 
methodology of operations research that prevents the new 
discipline from attaining independent status? I believe that 
there is. I am not concerned here with the techniques de- 
veloped (or appropriated) by operations research such as 
linear programming, information theory, queueing theory, 
game theory, and the like. While the value in application 
of some of these techniques may be questionable, there can 
be no objection to their use and further development if they 
prove to be effective. Rather, I refer to the difficult problem 
as to the selection of appropriate criteria by which a solu- 
tion achieved by operations research methods is to be 
judged. 
Public Addresses 47 
Operations research in attempting the solution of either 
military or industrial problems must make, or have made 
for it, a decision as to the objective or objectives to be at- 
tained. This decision as to objective implies the selection 
of an appropriate criterion. Selection of an inappropriate 
criterion can result in suboptimization; that is, the objective 
of a part of the organization will be achieved to the possible 
detriment of overall organizational suc~ess .~  For example, 
in the economic theory of the firm, it is often assumed that 
an appropriate criterion is the maximization of total profits 
over some time horizon. Yet, as I read the operations re- 
search literature relating to the theory of the firm, there 
is little recognition of the implications of profit maximiza- 
tion. Amidst a welter of inverted matrices and symbolic 
logic, one too often finds a piecemeal approach applying 
clearly inappropriate criteria. I submit that so long as some 
operations research practitioners continue in their industrial 
efforts to ignore the lessons of sophomore econo~ics one 
must agree with Charles Bitch who has written from within 
the profession: 
Where money values are used to measure effort and merit, 
a weak but highly significant kind of optimizing process re- 
sults in an economy-one with which Adam Smith was fa- 
miliar, and with which operations researchers ought to be 
but generally are not.8 
I do not suggest that operations research techniques are 
necessarily unsuited for managerial application. Nor would 
I contend that economics provides such powerful guides to 
business decisions that no useful area remains where opera- 
tions research can make a contribution. Quite the opposite. 
But it is discouraging to find operations research tecllniques 
applied uncritically and in apparent ignorance of well-es- 
tablished findings in theoretical and applied economics, in- 
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dustrial administration, and industrial engineering. Indeed, 
in the bulk of the operations research literature, the atten- 
tion given to the selectioil of appropriate criteria by which 
alternative courses of action in the industrial environment 
are to be judged is extren~ely cursory and disjointed. 
This omission would not be so objectionable were it not 
for the fact that operations research purports to embrace the 
selection of appropriate criteria and thereby to provide defin- 
itive guides for business decisions. At  the worst, operations 
research implies a substitution of something for the execu- 
tive function. As to precisely what it is that is to be substi- 
tuted, I am uncertain, and I find little enlightenment in the 
literatwe. We are told by Bernard Xoopman in an analysis 
of the fallacies of operations research that: 
"Authorititis" is that regression to logical infantilism which 
believes that the missing links in one's solution of a problem, 
as well as the common sense required for relating it to reality, 
can be readily supplied by the uniformed officer or the 
company executive who must eventually use the result.9 
Along similar lines, Ellis Johnson hzs written: 
. . . Its most distinguishing characteristic [referring to opera- 
tions research] stems from the fact that i t  has been con- 
cerned, since its inception, with the overall aspects of action 
systems. In  general, the older professions that exist to serve 
management have made a sound, healthy application of 
scientific principles to separate elements of action systems. 
Operations research is more concerned with "optimizing" the 
operations of the whole organization than with improving 
operations within one division thereof. Obviously, in order to 
study and understand the overall system, operations research 
must study and understand all of the components, and so is 
interested in serving management at all levels within the sys- 
tem. Only thus can it serve the whole organization.1° 
While it is eminently proper for Koopman to decry the 
evils of "authorititis" and for Johnson to note that "optinliza- 
tion" must refer to the activities of the entire firm, it is far 
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from clear to what extent operations research activities com- 
plement traditional decision-making processes, and to what 
extent operations research attempts to substitute for execu- 
tive functions. My own view is that the successful application 
of operations research techniques is definitely contingent 
upon an operations research group working subordinate to 
and under the direction of management. Specifically, I am 
less disturbed by the dangers of "authorititis" than I am by 
the possibility that the choice of appropriate criteria by op- 
erations research groups will be excessively naive. 
Rather than claiming that the application of operations 
research technique magically enables one to ask the right 
questions in addition to providing the right answers, is it not 
possible that the operations research profession could be 
fully and efficiently employed in the solution of industrial 
problems given to them by separate operating divisions and, 
perhaps less frequently, by top management? No one, I am 
sure, would wish to proscribe an operations research group 
from serious thought about, and analysis of, as Johnson puts 
it, entire "action systems." But, until this infant discipline 
demonstrates more maturity, I doubt very seriously that sub- 
stantial responsibility for decision making should be re- 
moved from top levels of management. 
I will proceed now to consider briefly whether the opera- 
tions research technique can be of value in business situa- 
tions, Earlier remarks as to the extravagance of some esti- 
mates of operations research and references to the difficulties 
inherent in the selection of appropriate criteria could be 
taken to mean that operations research is valueless in the 
industrial environment. I would judge that the operations 
research technique can be of definite value in industry. 
Doubts arise in my own mind only to the extent that opera- 
tions research practitioners view their discipline with such 
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enthusiasm that they fail to appreciate difficulties inherent 
in the industrial environment. 
To be somewhat more specific I would contend that most 
of the barriers to effective decision-making in industry o c  
cur not for want of knowledge as to how a problem might 
be analyzed if needed information were available. Aside 
from difficulties of internal communication and the irreduci- 
ble uncertainties of the future, the major barrier is the em- 
barrassing wealth of irrelevant information and the deplor- 
able scarcity of relevant data. Even the fabulous capacities 
of modern electronic computers may be overtaxed in some 
industrial situations with the digestion of trivial and mis- 
leading infolmation. Some comfort may be drawn from the 
fact that these machines seem to survive in the military and 
governmental establishments. 
I t  is distressing that in crucial areas of industrial budget- 
ing and control, financial data eminently suitable for stock- 
holder consumption and internal revenue purposes continue 
to provide only the most imperfect guide to managerial de- 
cisions. However one views the growth of operations re- 
search, it does seem inescapable that the application of very 
refined techniques to aid business decision-making will ne- 
cessitate prior improvement in the quality of the basic data. 
Perhaps the interim period in which superior data reporting 
systems are being developed will allow the operations re- 
search profession time in which to adapt its methods more 
closely to the needs of industrial situations. One can hope 
that in the process of this adaptation, t l~e  findings of estab- 
lished disciplines will not be ignored entirely. 
Indeed, there are, or should be, no vested interests in this 
regard. Wherever operations research can add to existing 
tools of analysis or contribute to the development of more 
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relevant data, that contribution is welcome. There have been 
tangible achievements by operations research and the future 
may bring f~zrther progress. Operations research is best 
viewed as a means of bringing the undoubted skills of ap- 
plied scientists to bear upon specific industrial problems. In 
the last analysis, only operational experience can determine 
the extent to which operations research will be of value to 
industrial managers. 
JOHN E. HODGES 
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